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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE lVIEDICAL EMERGENCY STATUTE SPECIFIES ONLY THE TYPE OF
COVERAGE A MOTOR VEHICLE POLICY MUST INCLUDE

The Medical Emergency statute ("U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1)(a)(v)") at issue, as
amended, is not ambiguous and specifies only the type of coverage automobile policies
must contain. It does not confer any substantive rights or alter tort law. That statute
provides:
(l)(a) In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21,
Insurance Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part 2, Liability Insurance in
General, a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under Subsection 31(A)-22302(l){a) shall:
(v) cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of
a motor vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis,
seizure, or other unconscious condition and who is not reasonably
aware that paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about
to occur to the extent that a person of ordinary prudence would not
attempt to continue driving.
(b) The driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) is limited to
the insurance coverage.
If the statute is "unambiguous", then the Court need look no further than the plain
language of the statute. Wilcox v. CSK, 70 P.3d 85, ,rs (UT 2003).
"When interpreting a statute, our goal is to give effect to the legislature's
intent and purpose." .... "To determine that intent, we look to the plain
language of the statute, reading it as a whole and interpreting its provisions
to ensure harmony with other provisions in the same chapter and related
chapters." . . . . "In doing so, we seek to render all parts thereof relevant and
meaningful, and we accordingly avoid interpretations that will render
portions of the statute superfluous or inoperative." .... "Discerning the plain
meaning of a term may start with the dictionary, since it catalogues "a
range of possible meanings that a statutory term may bear." But if the
statutory language remains ambiguous, we may resort to other indications
of legislative intent, including legislative history and policy consideration."
(Emphasis added).
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Craig v. Provo City (2015 UT App.145, 15).
The plain language of the statute, as well as other chapters of the insurance code
supports Lancer's position that the Medical Emergency statute only describes the type of
coverage a policy must contain. It does not provide for strict liability or confer any other
substantive rights. The preamble to the Medical Emergency statute, §31A-22-303(l)(a)
establishes this and provides:
In addition to complying with the requirements of Chapter 21, Insurance
Contracts in General, and Chapter 22, Part II, Liability Insurance in General, a
policy of motor vehicle liability coverage under §31A-22-302{l)(a) shall ...
Q

"Shall" refers to the requirements of various sections of the Medical Emergency statute
and cross-references this statute with §31A-22-302(l)(a)-Required components of motor
vehicle insurance policies-Exceptions (the "Component statute"). When read as a whole,
the Medical Emergency statute supports Lancer's position that it only addresses the type
of coverage a motor vehicle liability policy is required to have and the allowable
exclusions and limitations. For example: subsection (l){a)(i) addresses the necessary
policy information such as: the purchaser of the policy, the named insured and their
address, the coverage afforded, the premium charged, the policy period, and the liability
limits; Subsection (l)(a)(ii)(A)(B) discusses the requirements of an owner's policy versus
an operator's policy and the differences, respectively; Subsection (I)( a)(iii) addresses
resident relative status; Subsection (l)(a)(iv) addresses the legal effect of step-down
provisions; Subsection (l)(a)(v), the section at issue, requires that a policy include
coverage for an unforeseen medical emergency resulting in injury. Other sections
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address different types of policies and the relationship to motor vehicle liability coverage,
such as prorating insurance, adding additional coverage to the basic coverage and
limiting coverage to a motor vehicle business (2)(a)(i)(ii)(iii), respectively. The point
being that §3 lA-22-303(1) (a), addresses the type of allowable coverages, limitations and
exclusions in motor vehicle liability policies. It does not address the substantive issues or
the application of that coverage to a specific event.
In addition, the Medical Emergency and Component statutes cross-reference each
other and outline the required components for motor vehicle insurance policies. The
Component statute provides that:
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy the
owner's or operator's security requirements of Section 41-12a-301 shall include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections JlA-22-303 and 3 lA-22304;
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 3 lA-22-305;
(c) underinsured motorist coverage under Section 3 lA -22-305.3; and
(d) ...personal injury protection under Sections 3 lA-22-306 through 3 IA-22309. (Emphasis added).

The Medical Emergency statute, an amendment to §31-22-303, only requires that
there be coverage for an unforeseen medical emergency as another necessary
component of a motor vehicle liability policy.
The plain language of the statute when read in conjunction with other
insurance code provisions supports Lancer's position that the Medical Emergency
statute unambiguously describes only those coverages a motor vehicle liability
policy must have. This is also supported by the Utah Court of Appeals' decision
in State v. Biggs, 167 P.3d 544, -,J 15 (UT. App. 2007) which confirms that the

-3-

Medical Emergency statute "simply specifies what coverage a vehicle insurance
policy must include in order to satisfy the Motor Vehicle Insurance Code
Requirements". See also Judge Christine Johnson's ruling on the Injured Parties
motion for summary judgment in the state court action: "[i]t simply directs that
insurance policies for motor vehicles must include coverage for damages resulting
from drivers who suffer from an unforeseeable unconscious condition." (R.71).
Contrary to the Injured Parties position the Medical Emergency statute is not
ambiguous and simply directs that motor vehicle liability policies provide coverage for
injuries and damages resulting from drivers who suffer an unforeseen medical condition.
POINT II
FOR RECOVERY THE MEDICAL EMERGENCY STATUTE
REQUIRES PROOF OF FAULT

The Injured Parties contend that the "shall cover" language in the Medical
Emergency statute "imposes liability on an incapacitated driver with no consideration of
whether the driver was negligent or not." (Injured Parties' Opening Brief at 9-10). The
Injured Parties draw a distinction between using the word "cover" ("coverage") in this
section of the statute rather than the word "insure" ("insurance") found in other sections
of the statute to support their position that the Medical Emergency statute imposes strict
liability on a driver who suffers an unforeseen medical emergency. This is a "distinction
without a difference," which the Insured Parties apparently agree with. (See Injured
Parties' Opening Brief at 12.). The Injured Parties are advocating for the use of the term
"coverage" to support their position that the Medical Emergency statute establishes strict
liability, negating any requirement they prove fault.
-4-

The legislature, however, expressly stated during the floor debates discussing the
Medical Emergency statute that "this particular addition to the law does not circumvent
the tort law that exists now .... " (Emphasis added). (Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor
Debates: 6:6-11 ). As such, the Medical Emergency statute is a coverage statute and only
describes the type of coverages all motor vehicle liability policies must have. The intent
was not to create a cause of action for strict liability. This is apparent from the use of the
term "cover" in that statute which suggests that it is the insurance policy which forms the
contractual relationship between the insured and the insurer and that determines the
~

application of the coverage to a specific event, not the statute.
The terms ''cover" and "coverage" have a specific meaning under the policy and
Utah case law. These terms refer to the duties owed under a liability insurance policy by
the insurer to the insured; referring to the duty to defend those risks within the coverage
of the policy and the duty to indemnify if they can show legal entitlement to damages
under the policy. Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210 ,r,r 14-17, 22, 27-29, 32
(UT. 2004).
The Injured Parties agree that the policy and Utah case law establish the meaning
of the words "cover"/"coverage", specifically referring to the insurer's duties to defend
and indemnify if an insured becomes legally liable. (the Injured Parties' Opening Brief,

Id. 17). In this case, the Injured Parties are asserting the duty to indemnify. Yet, they have
no contractual relationship to Lancer, as such the duty to indemnify does not arise until
the Injured Parties obtain a judgment. (Benjamin, ,r,r 14, 17, 27). The Injured Parties are
not the insureds.
-5-

The insurance policy governs when the insurer's duty to indemnify is triggered.

Benjamin, at ,r 27. "Typically, an insured's legal liability for damages arises when
judgment is entered against him." Id.,I 29 1• Lancer's duty to indemnify does not arise
until such a judgment is entered under the policy covering the Injured Parties claims
against the alleged tortfeasors, Debra Jarvis and Lake Shore Motor Coach lines Inc.
("Lake Shore").
Coverage pursuant to the Lancer policy is governed by Section II-Liability
Coverage, which provides:

A.

Coverage

We will pay all sums an "insured" legally must pay as damages because
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies.
Caused by an "accident" and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or
use of a covered "auto."
We have the right and duty to defend any "insured" against a "suit" asking
for such damages ....
This provision mirrors that found in §31A-22-303(ii)(A) which provides that an owner's
policy shall, amongst other provisions, insure " against loss from the liability imposed

by law ( which is similar to the "legally must pay" language in the Lancer policy ) for
damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the~e motor vehicles ....
(Emphasis added). Again requiring that the Injured Parties show that they are "legally
entitled" to damages under the policy, when there is a judgment entered against the
tortfeasors.
1

This is a third party case, so the Injured Parties have no contractual relationship with
Lancer. As such, Lancer's legal liability doesn't arise until a judgment is entered against
its insureds, Debra Jarvis and Lake Shore.
-6-

There is no language in the Medical Emergency statute that allows for strict
liability and supports the Injured Parties' position that they are entitled to recover without
proof of fault. This would be in violation of basic negligence law. In Speros, the Utah
·Supreme Court interpreted §31A-22-303 and determined that "its provisions mandate
coverage for liabilities imposed by existing tort law and do not create new liabilities. See
Speros at~ 43 (holding that §3 lA-22-303 "requires coverage for all liabilities imposed by

law," whether they rise out of negligence or intentional acts). See Randle v. Allen, 862
P.2d 1329, 1335 (UT. 1993) (holding there is no tort liability for personal injury "absent

-iJ

fault or negligence on the part of the defendant."). Also, the language doesn't create an
extra-contractual duty obligating Lancer to pay the Injured Parties who have not yet
proven the insured's legal liability. 2
Under the terms and conditions of the policy the Injured Parties still have to
establish there is coverage by showing "legal entitlement" before there is any duty to
indemnify. To show "legal entitlement" still requires they prove fault.

POINT III
THERE IS NO AMBIGUITY SO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
IS NOT APPLICABLE

In the alternative, if there is an ambiguity, the Injured Parties request that the
Court refer to legislative history to interpret the Medical Emergency statute to support
their position that strict liability applies and they don't have to prove fault. A court may
not, however, consider legislative history unless the plain meaning of the statute is
2

The Injured Party has no direct right of action against the insurer, Speros, citing to Utah
Code Ann. §31A-22-201.
-7-

"ambiguous" or would "work an absurd result," neither of which applies to the Medical
Emergency statute. LPI Servs. v. McGee, 215 P.3d 135, iI 11 (UT. 2009).
Furthermore, courts do not favor the use of legislative history to show legislative
intent. The Utah Supreme Court in Graves v. Northeastern Services, Inc., 345 P.3d 619,
,I75 (UT. 2015) expressed concern over the use oflegislative history, noting that the
search for legislative intent is perilous for the following reasons:
[I]n many cases, it is difficult to discover the motives, which may have
prompted those who drew up the text; but it is also dangerous to construe
upon supposed motives, if they are not plainly expressed. Everyone is apt
to substitute what his motives would have been, or perhaps, unconsciously,
to fashion the supposed motives according to his own interest and views of
the case; and nothing is a more ready means to bend laws, charters, wills,
treatises etc., according to preconceived purposes, then by their
construction upon supposed motives. To be brief, unless motives are
expressed, it is exceedingly difficult to find them out, except by the text
itself; they must form, therefore, in most cases, a subject to be found out by
the text, not the ground on which we construe it.
Judge Johnson in her June 6, 2014 ruling on the Injured Parties' motion for
summary judgment in the state court, noted that: "the use of isolated quotes from floor
debates to divine the intent of the legislature as a whole is problematic, at best " citing to
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222,237 (1984). Specifically, that:

C

~

Oral testimony of witnesses and individual Congressmen, unless very
precisely directed to the intended meaning of particular words in a statute,
can seldom be expected to be as precise as the enacted language itself. To
permit what we regard as clear statutory language to be materially altered
by such colloquies, which often take place before the bill has achieved its
final form, would open the door to the inadvertent or perhaps even planned
undermining of the language actually voted on by congress and signed into
law[.]

(R. 70-71).
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The Injured Parties cite to various statements made during the floor debates which
resulted in the Medical Emergency statute. Noteworthy, none of these cites shows any
discussion of the use of the words "cover''/ "coverage and "insure/insurance". Because
these words were not addressed no precise meaning can be attributed to them. As such,
one can only guess the intentions of the legislators in using the different verbiage in the
statute (§3 IA-22-303).
Also, the Injured Parties selection of excerpts from the floor debates does not
support their position that the Medical Emergency statute establishes strict liability, but to
the contrary, the floor debates expressly state that it doesn't alter tort law. For example,
the Injured Parties cite to these passages:
.... we have case law in a number of different situations that the juries and
judges have ruled that there is no liability when there's an unforeseen
medical problem occurring with a driver.
(Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor Debates: 4: 24-25; 5: 1-2).
Right now the law indicates that the only way you can recover damages,
either liability or property damage is to prove that there was negligence
involved. And in the case of medical-unforeseen medical problems, the
courts have ruled that-that is not negligence, it was unforeseen,
. unpredictable and, in some cases unavoidable.
(Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor Debates: 5: 24-25; 6: 1-5).
The Injured Parties rely on these passages to show that the intent of the legislature was
for the Medical Emergency statute to allow strict liability in circumstances of an
unforeseen medical problem. Nowhere is that discussed in the floor debates. In fact, the
floor debates indicate that in enacting the Medical Emergency statute, the legislature
specifically stated that the intent was not to "circumvent tort law". Specifically, stating
-9-

that: "this particular addition to the law does not circumvent the tort law that exists now,
that you still have the opportunity to resort to the court law, ... But in the case of an
unforeseen medical problem, this would limit the payout to the amount of the insurance
coverage." (Exhibit 1: Transcript of Floor Debates: 6: 6-11). The express intent of the
Medical Emergency statute was not to alter tort law by establishing strict liability, but to
provide coverage for a unforeseen medical emergency, and as with all policies, limit the
payout to the amount of insurance coverage.
Judge Johnson reached the same conclusion in her June 16, 2014 ruling that the
use of floor debates and similar sources of legislative history are not relied upon when the
language of the statute itself is clear. (R. 71 ). In discussing the statute at issue, Judge
Johnson determined that the plain language of Subsection (v) "is not ambiguous". "It
simply directs that insurance policies for motor vehicles must include coverage for
damages resulting from drivers who suffer from an unforeseeable unconscious
condition". (R. 71).
Judge Johnson concluded, as did Lancer, that "Subsection (v) ... by its own terms
.. .it applies to the obligations of an insurer to provide coverage...." (R.74). As such, the
Medical Emergency statute only described the type of coverage necessary it has no effect
on tort law, nor does it alter tort law, by creating a cause of action for strict liability.
The statute at issue is not ambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute is to provide
for the type of coverages to be included in motor vehicle liability policies. Because the
statute is not ambiguous the use of legislative history to show intent and/or the use of
floor debates is not appropriate. More importantly, the statute at issue when read as a
- 10 -

whole is in a section of the insurance code which addresses the type of coverages and
limitations and exclusions allowable and required in motor vehicle liability policies.
Nowhere in that statute does it mention, discuss or address strict liability or any other
issues concerning tort law. As such, these sections do not support the Injured Parties'
position, and are not relevant. Most significantly, the floor debates expressly state that
the Medical Emergency statute is not intended " to circumvent tort law".

POINT IV
THE INJURED PARTIES ARE ONLY ENTITLED TO THE STATUTORY
MINIMUM, IF ANYTHING
If the Court agrees with Lancer's position that the Medical Emergency statute only
specifies the type of coverage that a motor vehicle liability policy must provide and that
the Sudden Incapacity defense is good law, then the Injured Parties are not entitled to
Iii>

damages. Under the reasoning in Speros, however, the Injured Parties may be entitled to
the statutory minim1un of $25k. (§3 lA-22-304).
The Injured Parties take issue with that and maintain that because Lake Shore is a
motor carrier as defined by U.C.A §72-9-102(4) it is subject to different minimum
insurance requirements, in this case a statutory minimum of $7 50k. (Admin. Code R909-

l-3 (2)). This minimum, however, applies only to a private motor carrier, "not a for hire
motor carrier". Lake Shore is not a private carrier, but a "for hire" carrier, and as such,
the 750k minimum does not apply. (Admin. Code R909-J-3(1)(2)).
The Injured Parties are aware that Lake Shore, a motor carrier, is "for hire" and is
~

not a private motor carrier. This is evidenced by the Injured Parties complaints filed in
the state court actions wherein they alleged "the Alpine School District contracted with
- 11 -

defendant Lake Shore to transport the American Fork High School band by bus to and
from a band competition in Idaho." (Emphasis added). (Exhibit 2: The Injured Parties'
Complaints filed in the state court action, General Allegations 17 and R.47-48). It
follows, then, that if a minimum applies it is the $25k statutory minimum.

CONCLUSIONS
Lancer requests this Court find that: ( 1) the Sudden Incapacity defense is good
law, that tort law does not impose liability absent fault; (2) the Medical Emergency
statute is not ambiguous, and describes only the type of coverage a inotor vehicle liability
policy must contain; (3) the Medical Emergency statute is not ambiguous so legislative
construction and history is not necessary; (4) the Medical Emergency statute at issue does
not create a cause of action for strict liability; (5) the policy language controls any right
of indemnification; and (6) if the Injured Parties are entitled to any recovery, it is limited
to the statutory minimum of $25k.
DATED this ~'1iay of July, 2016.

64/H,,;/
Barbara L. Maw
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
1.

Transcript of the floor debates.

2.
The Crane, Hutchison, Seppi and Thayne Complaints filed in the state court
actions.
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SENATOR JONES:

We--we have put it back in.

3

On the last line of that amendment sheet, we've put it

4

back in with a proper reference of one in parentheses,

5

A in parentheses and iv in parentheses.

6

the only change.

7

amendment remains

8
9

And that's

The wording of the--of the original
the same.

SENATOR STEINER:

I'm--I'm troubled by the

fact that you would limit the driver's liability.

I

10

mean, it's a very difficult problem if someone has a

11

paralysis, say, that suddenly strikes them, they have

12

no warning, and they have an accident.

13

happens if that person hit a child who's going to need

14

services for the rest of their lives?

15

And what

You're deciding here--are you deciding here

16

that the--the driver won't have to contribute to that,

17

once his insurance company has paid off?

18

SENATOR JONES:

That's an excellent question,

19

and according to the existing law if' we use the

20

scenario you described, if we hit a child and had a

21

medical problem with a driver, the driver would not be

22

held liable for any--any coverage, not even his

23

insurance coverage.

24
25

And we have case law in a number of different
situations that the juries and the judges have ruled
4

1

that there's no liability when there's an unforeseen

2

medical problem occurring with a driver.

3

bill is changing that to put a liability on the

4

driver, but only up to the maximum amount of the

5

insurance on the vehicle.

6

good bill from that aspect, that the in--injured party

7

would at least recover the amount of the insurance;

8

whereas, existing law they would not recover anything.

9

And, of course, to the victim--regardless of

And so my

So we believe that it's a

10

why the driver caused the damage, the victim still

11

suffers the damage.

12

correct a loophole in that law that needed to be

13

closed.

And so we believe this will

14

PRESIDENT:

Question, Senator Wharton?

15

SENATOR WHARTON:

16

SENATOR JONES:

17

SENATOR WHARTON:

Yield to a question?
I -will.
Can you give me a scenario

18

of the way the law is now and then how it would be

19

when your--if this bill is passed?

20

us are confused over here exactly--you're saying that

21

right now--well, could you give me--yeah, could you

22

try that and then maybe that will help us?

23

SENATOR JONES:

Because a lot of

I'll be glad to give

24

examples.

Right now the law indicates that the only

25

way you can recover damages, either liability or
5

1

property damage, is to prove that there was negligence

2

involved.

3

medical problems, the courts have ruled that--that

4

that is not negligence, it was unforeseen,

5

unpredictable and, in some cases, unavoidable.

6

And in the case of medical--unforeseen

And remembering that--that this particular

7

addition to the law does not circumvent the tort law

8

that exists now, that you still have the opportunity

9

to resort to the court law, if you want to.

But in

10

the case of unforeseen medical problems, this would

11

limit the payout to the amount of insurance covered.

12
13
14

I'm not sure--was there something else in
your question that I needed to address?
SENATOR WHARTON:

So--so you're saying right

15

now--if you get in an accident and there's some

16

unforeseen medical costs down the road, you're saying

17

right now I can't sue you--if you did that to--to me,

18

I can't sue you for those damages right now?

19

what you're saying?

20

SENATOR JONES:

That's true.

Is that

And let--let me

21

give you an--an ex--a real-time example.

The one--and

22

I have several of them here in my portfolio that I

23

could cite, but I won't bore your with them.

24

think one that's very important, a 23-year-old young

25

man was driving down the street, lost control of his

But I
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ELIZABETH HUTCIDSON, an
individual,

SECOND AlVIENDED COMPLAINT AND
DEMAND FOR JURY
Plaintiff,

TRIAL

vs.
Tier3

DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual;
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES,
INC., a corporation; and LANCER
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation,

Civil: 130100101

ge. Clnisthre Jolmson
Defendants.

COl\ffiS NOW, Plaintiff, Elizabeth Hutchison, by and through her attorneys,
Michael Esplin, and Laura Cabanilla, and for cause of action against defendants alleges
and avers as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1

l

.

-

.

~

.

. -... ··-- I

fi

II
i

'~

I

I~

1. ·This Court·hasjurisdictionpursuant to tf.C.A:. ·§78A--S--=1G2("1):

········ .. ___ __/.

-· - - -·---··-----¾.--Venue-is-p:ooper--in.-this-Court.pursuant to_U:~G.-.A!...§7!1}-~. .g07 ~ipce ~ef~dant

- -- ·-

•- -·--- ·- - -

...... ··- ..

·I:>ebra-I&y-Jarv-is-is-a-1:es-icfont-sf..Uta.h..County.,_State_oflltah,..an_g_L_ak
___e__S__h~.o....,.r~~-M=•;;;;..ot~Qr=---- _ _ _
Coach Lines, Inc. is a corporation doing business in Utah County, State of Utah. Lancer
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah.

PARTIES
3. ELIZABETH HUTCHISON ("Hutchison'~ is an individual residing in Utah

County, Utah.
4. · LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. (''hereinafter referred to as
"Lake Shore'~ is a. Utah corpo;ration.doing_l;>1;t$~~~ -~ Utah as Lake
Shore Motor
Coach
······ .
...
.
...
•·

'

,·

'

·••

Lines, Inc.
5. DEBRA KAY JAR.VIS (hereinafter referre4 to as "Jarvis'? is an individual

residing in Utah who at all times relevant herein was an employee and ag~t ~f defendant
ore.
6. LANCER INSURANCE CO1\.1PANY (hereinafter referred to as "Lancer',) is.
an insurance company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of
automobile insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2

..

1

-------

.. ,

·-··-

·-··------ ··----···
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_,.. _ _ _ _ _

.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ~ - • • • 4 . . . . . . . -
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···•-··•·-····•
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I

II

I

II

I

I
· .. -· · - - ·- · ·H -~-~---·· ..7:-

On October 10, 2009, the Alpine SchooH:>istrict·had·-contracted defendant Lake

-·--- - - -----Shore-to-fxansp01:t-the-Am.em.can-BorkHigh_scho.olbandJ:iy_bJ!S to and from a b~cl

- - .........--competition-in-Idah~----··-.:--..--------------8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore.

9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake
Shore.
10. ·Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I-15 freeway in Idaho
returning-the passengers to Utah when she- lost control of the bus causing the bus to
leave the roadway, travel over ao., embanlanent, _eventuaUy. ~hing on i~ si~e ca1:18ing;
Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages as set forth below.

11. Defendant Lancer was sent a written notice and claim against the policy of
insurance insuring Lake Shore and Jarvis for damages caus~d by the bus accident on

12. Defendant Lancer did not respond to the claims of the Plaintiff.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence).

13. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference.
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:tv.1ICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
EsPLIN I WEIGHT

290 West Center Street
P.O.BoxL
Provo, Utah 84603-0200

-- -- --·-----------

Telephone: 801.373.4912
Facsimile: 801.371.6964
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIFFANY THAYNE, an individual,

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY

Plaintiff,

TRIAL

vs.

Tier3

DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual;
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES,
INC., a coi:poration; and LANCER
INSURANCE COMPANY, an.Illinois

Civil:
Judge:

corporation,

@

----==========D===e=-fe=nd=an=ts-=·-===-=~-----------------,--...J-

CO1\.1ES NOW, Plaintiff; Tiffany Thayne, by and through her attomey, Michael
Esplin, and for cause of action against defendants alleges and avers as follows:

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A §78A-5-102(1).

1

2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78B-3-307 since defendant
Debra Kay J~is is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and Lake Shore Motor
· · · CoacEl:;mes~ Inc. ·ts· a·corporation domg· bttsmess· m Utah Counfy;·-state o
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah.

PARTIES
3. TIFFANY 1HAYNE ("Thayne") is an individual residing in Utah County,
Utah.
4. LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. ("hereinafter referred to as
"Lake Shore") is a Utah corporation doing business in Utah as Lake Shore Motor Coach
Lines, Inc.
. 5. DEBRA KAY.JARVIS (hereinafter referred to as "Jarvis") is an individual
residing in Utah who at all times relevant herein was an employee and agent of defendant
Lake Shore.
6. LANCER INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter referred to as ''Lancer") is
an insurance company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of
automobile insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis.

2

... ···- . .. .

... ·1"'

-

... ··-· ----------

--·--··-·-·•·

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7. On October 10, 2009, the Alpine School District had contracted defendant Lake
·Shore to transport the American Fo:dcHigh school band by bus to and·
competition in Idaho.
8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore.

9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake
Shore.
10. Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I-15 freeway in Idaho
returning the passengers to Utah when she lost control of the bus causing the bus to
leave the roadway, travel over an embanlanent, eventuaJ.;ty crashing on its side causing
Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages as set forth below.
11. Defendant Lancer was sent a written notice and claim against the policy of

~-------------------------------------~
insurance insuring Lake Sho_re and Jarvis for damages caused by the bus accident on
January 9, 2011.
12. Defendant Lancer did not respond to the claims of the Plaintiff.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)

13. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference~

3

:N.IICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009)
ESPLIN I WEIGHT

·
~

290 West Center Street
P.O.BoxL
· Provo, Utah 84603-0200 ·
Telephone: 801.373.4912
Facsimile: 801.371.6964
Attorneys for Plaintiff

·
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AMERICAN FORK
DEPARTMENT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

JANNA CRANE,
an individual,
Plaintiff,

Tier 3

vs.
DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual;
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH
LINES, INC., a corporation; and
Civil: 130100098
Judge: Christine Johnson

an Illinois corporation,
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Janna Crane, by and through her attorney, Michael Esplin,
and for cause of action against defendants alleges and avers as follows:
1

· -

j

f

.,

I

~
· JURISDICTION AND VENUE
I. This Comthasjurisclictionpursuantto U.C.A. §78A-5-102(1).
........... .i.

__ .. _ _ ...

"•

· 2.· Venue·is propet'in: tms·eouttJmrsuant·ra TT.CA. -§1&13-3'-3'C)7 •since defendant· ·
@

Debra KayJarvis is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah, and Lake Shore Motor
Coach Lines, Inc. is a COlJ>oration doing business in Utah County, State of Utah. Lancer
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah.

PARTIES
3. JANNA CRANE ("Crane") is an individual residing in Utah County, Utah.
4. LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. (''hereina:ft~ referred to as
· . ··· ''Lake· Shore") is a:Utah corporati.en doing business in Utah-as Lake-Shore,Motor Coaeh, •
Lines, Inc.
5. DEBRA KAY JARVIS (hereinafter referred to as "Jarvis") is an indiyidual
residing in Utah who at all times relevant ~erein was an employee and agent of defendant

Lake Shore.
6. LANCER INSURANCE COMPANY (hereinafter referred to as "Lancer'') is
an insurance company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of
automobile insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2

I

l

I
.j

!
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.f

· - - -·--- -- ·- ~... · ·?." ·01rOctober 10, 2009, the Alpine School District had-contracted defendant Lake
..

-•

• "'••••--••&•>,····"· .. -·••••·•

Shore to transport the American Fork High school band by bus to and from a band
-••• ---•
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·· · competition: in Tdan'.o~ · "· · · · 8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore.

9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake

Shore.
10. Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I" 15 freeway in Idaho
returning the passengers to Utah when she.lost control of the bus '?ausing the bus to
· · .. '"leave the·roadway; travel'over.an:embankment, eventually crashing ·on its··side causing · · ···
Plaintiff to suffer general and special damages .as set forth below.

11. Defendant Lancer was sent a written notice and claim against the policy of
insurance insming Lake Shore and Jarvis for damages caused by the bus accident on

~---------------------------------------1.----1Febl"U8I'Y 13, 2011.

12. Defendant Lancer did not respond to the claims of the Plaintiff.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)

13. The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference.
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MICHAEL D. ESPLIN (1009) .

I

ESPLIN WEIGHT

290 West Center Street
P.O. BoxL
Provo, Utah 84603-0200
Telephone: 801.373.4912
Facsimile: 801.371.6964
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEITE SEPPI, an individ~,

AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DEMAND
FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Tier 3

DEBRA KAY JARVIS, an individual;
LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES,
INC., a corporation; and LANCER
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation,

Civil: 140400088
Judge: Lynn W. Davis

Defendants.

CO:tvlES NOW, Plaintiff, Mette Seppi, by and through her attorney, Michael Esplin,
and for cause of action against defendants alleges and avers as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1

''

-

--.·----··----- ......._ --- ...

... -··----··

-·-·- ,. - -- .... ___

..

_.

----·- ·---------------------------

...

1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.CA. §78A-5-102(1).

2. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to U.C.A. §78B-3-307 since defendant

Coach Lines, Inc. is a corporation doing business in Utah <;!aunty, State of Utah. Lancer
Insurance Company is an Illinois corporation doing business in the State of Utah_.

PARTIES
3. MEITI SEPPI ("Seppi") is an individual residing in Utah County, Utah.

4. LAKE SHORE MOTOR COACH LINES, INC. ("hereinafter referred to as

"Lake Shore") is a Utah corporation doing· busin~s. in Utali as Lake Shore.Motor Coach
Lines, Inc.
••

♦._

•••

..,

•

.

♦

-

4• I

; . . . '. . ..... -:-•-'I, ,:·'• ... -• ....

5. DEBRA KAY JARVIS (hereinafter referred to as· CCJa.rvis'') is ~individual

residing in Utah who at all times rel~vant herein w~ an employee and ag~t of defendant
Lake Shore..

an insurance_ company doing business in the State of Utah which provided a policy of
automobile :insurance to Defendants Lake Shore and Jarvis.

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

2

~

,;ii

,

-----·------.. - - .... _...

,,.

... _. .,_,..,

____

.,

..

7. On October l 0, 2009, the Alpine School District had contraeted defendant Lake
S.hore to transport the American Fork High school band by bus to and from a band
=eompetitron"'i!f'Iclmrru.==-====-=========-=======--=======-=====-,.=====-==·===·===- ..

8. Defendant Jarvis was the driver/operator of defendant Lake Shore's bus and at
all times relevant hereto was the agent and employee of defendant Lake Shore.

9. Plaintiff was one of the student passengers being transported by defendant Lake
Shore: .
l 0. Defendant Jarvis was driving the Lake Shore bus on I-15 freeway in Idaho
returnkg the passengers to Utah when she lost ·control of the -bus causing the ·bus ~
leave the roadway, fl'avel ov~r an ~ankm~t, eventually cr~g on its side causing
f.;

Plamtiff to suffer general and ·special damages as set forth below.

·

11. Defendant Lancer has filed an action requesting declaratory judgment against
-

Plaintiff, plaintiffs in tbree.other.separat~ actions arising from the same a~ident and

Central Division, Case No. 2:14-CV-00785.
12. Defendant Lancer claims in ~e federal declaratory judgment action that
Lancer should not be responsible to pay the _claims ofPlaintiff.
Fm.ST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
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